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Abstract: 
 
Undergraduates (N = 274) participated in a weeklong daily-life experience-sampling study of 
mind wandering after being assessed in the lab for executive-control abilities (working memory 
capacity; attention-restraint ability; attention-constraint ability; and propensity for task-unrelated 
thoughts, or TUTs) and personality traits. Eight times a day, electronic devices prompted 
subjects to report on their current thoughts and context. Working memory capacity and attention 
abilities predicted subjects’ TUT rates in the lab, but predicted the frequency of daily-life mind 
wandering only as a function of subjects’ momentary attempts to concentrate. This pattern 
replicates prior daily-life findings but conflicts with laboratory findings. Results for personality 
factors also revealed different associations in the lab and daily life: Only neuroticism predicted 
TUT rate in the lab, but only openness predicted mind-wandering rate in daily life (both 
predicted the content of daily-life mind wandering). Cognitive and personality factors also 
predicted dimensions of everyday thought other than mind wandering, such as subjective 
judgments of controllability of thought. Mind wandering in people’s daily environments and 
TUTs during controlled and artificial laboratory tasks have different correlates (and perhaps 
causes). Thus, mind-wandering theories based solely on lab phenomena may be incomplete. 
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Article: 
 
before experimenting, isn’t it appropriate to know as exactly as possible on what one is going to 
experiment? (Sartre, 1936/2012, p. 127) 
 
Mind wandering is a subjective, typically spontaneous experience, yet psychologists and 
neuroscientists conduct most mind-wandering research under directed, controlled laboratory 
conditions. Subjects undertake a task that is periodically interrupted by thought probes asking 
them to report whether their immediately preceding thoughts were on or off task. This empirical 
strategy helps illuminate how mind wandering affects performance, or individual differences, in 
theoretically important laboratory tasks (e.g., McVay & Kane, 2012a, 2012b). But is it suitable 
for exploring the nature of mind wandering as it typically unfolds in human experience? Whereas 
the laboratory seems like a neutral and controlled context to researchers, it is a uniquely strange 
place to subjects and may ironically create idiosyncratic irregularities in their behavior and 
experiences (Rubin, 1989). This study expands on prior findings to show that the laboratory 
biases researchers’ perspective on individual differences in mind wandering. 
In a 2007 study of “feral cognition,” Kane et al. used daily-life experience-sampling methods 
(ESM) to determine whether cognitive abilities predicted undergraduates’ subjective experiences 
in the moment. They found that variation in working memory capacity (WMC; measured by 
three tasks) did not correlate with overall mind-wandering rates, but had an interactive effect 
with environmental demands. That is, only when students reported trying hard to concentrate, or 
when their activity felt cognitively demanding, did those with higher WMC mind-wander less 
than those with lower WMC. Kane et al. therefore argued that executive mechanisms regulate 
everyday thought and distraction only in demanding contexts. WMC did not moderate other 
contextual influences on mind wandering; for example, subjects with higher versus lower WMC 
did not differ in mind wandering as a function of how much they liked their activities, how 
boring or stressful their activities were, or how happy they felt. 
Subsequent evidence that executive-control failures contribute to mind wandering has come from 
laboratory findings that lower-WMC subjects report more task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs) than 
do higher-WMC subjects (e.g., Kane et al., 2016; McVay & Kane, 2012b; Robison, Gath, & 
Unsworth, 2017; Unsworth & McMillan, 2014). Also, during relatively simple executive-control 
tasks (e.g., go/no-go and Stroop tasks), poor performers report more TUTs than do better 
performers (Kane et al., 2016; McVay & Kane, 2012b; Robison et al., 2017; Unsworth, 
2015; Unsworth & McMillan, 2014). WMC also predicts TUTs best, and perhaps only, in 
relatively demanding tasks (e.g., Levinson, Smallwood, & Davidson, 2012; McVay & Kane, 
2012a; Rummel & Boywitt, 2014). So far, so good—laboratory and daily-life findings agree. 
However, two contradictions have arisen: (a) WMC does not always predict TUTs in demanding 
tasks (e.g., Krawietz, Tamplin, & Radvansky, 2012), and (b) in laboratory experiments requiring 
subjects to rate their concentration after each probe, as in Kane et al. (2007), Smeekens and Kane 
(2016) found that WMC did not moderate the association between concentration and mind 
wandering. 
Thus, WMC’s relation to mind wandering appears to be complex and may differ between 
laboratory and everyday settings, assuming that the daily-life results were reliable. The study 
by Kane et al. (2007) influenced theorizing about executive contributions to mind wandering, so 
it requires replication and extension. Because ESM studies are challenging and expensive, 
however, they elicit few replication attempts (but see Marcusson-Clavertz, Cardeña, & Terhune, 
20161). In the present study, we expanded on the original study by Kane et al. by using a larger 
sample size, measuring WMC more broadly, and assessing conscious experiences beyond mind 
wandering (e.g., thought controllability). Moreover, given theoretical claims regarding WMC’s 
executive-attentional basis, we expanded our assessment to include attention-restraint ability (via 
inhibitory-control tasks), attention-constraint ability (via flanker-interference tasks), and 
laboratory TUT propensity (via task-embedded thought probes), to test whether other executive-
control constructs also interact with prevailing cognitive demands in predicting mind wandering. 
Although executive-control abilities predict mind wandering, and executive failures may 
precipitate TUTs, mind-wandering theories disagree about the relative contributions of executive 
control and other trait and contextual variables (e.g., McMillan, Kaufman, & Singer, 
2013; McVay & Kane, 2010; Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013; Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 
2013). Personality traits are likely contributors to mind-wandering variation, as they influence a 
host of experiential constructs (e.g., Mehl, Gosling, & Pennebaker, 2006; Ozer & Benet-
Martínez, 2006). Surprisingly, though, few thought-sampling studies have investigated 
personality. Instead, researchers have primarily correlated personality scales with retrospective 
daydreaming questionnaires (McMillan et al., 2013), which are vulnerable to memory and 
reporting biases. Among the Big Five factors of personality, only neuroticism (Jackson, 
Weinstein, & Balota, 2013; Robison et al., 2017), conscientiousness (Jackson & Balota, 
2012; Jackson et al., 2013), and openness to experience (Smeekens & Kane, 2016) have been 
assessed as predictors of TUT rates measured using probes in the lab. 
These few studies suggest that the frequency of laboratory TUTs correlates positively with 
neuroticism (Jackson et al., 2013; Robison et al., 2017), correlates negatively with 
conscientiousness (Jackson & Balota, 2012; but see Jackson et al., 2013), but does not correlate 
with openness (Smeekens & Kane, 2016). The findings for neuroticism and conscientiousness fit 
well with theory and seem generalizable to everyday life (at least, in the case of 
conscientiousness, to activities requiring motivation). The null association between TUTs and 
openness, however, seems counterintuitive because openness is partially defined as reflecting a 
rich fantasy life (McCrae & Sutin, 2009). Indeed, openness correlates with responses on 
retrospective questionnaires assessing “positive-constructive” daydreaming (McMillan et al., 
2013). Perhaps these discrepant results indicate that high-openness people engage in frequent 
everyday mind wandering when circumstances allow, but can concentrate when necessary, such 
as during artificial laboratory tasks. 
These selective personality correlations, and the divergence between lab and daily-life findings 
concerning the effects of concentration on WMC’s association with mind wandering, suggest 
potentially important differences in mind-wandering experiences across environments, which 
would be consistent with the “context regulation” perspective offered by Smallwood and 
Andrews-Hanna (2013). In this view, because mind wandering’s costs and benefits vary by 
context, so will its regulation; researchers should therefore examine mind wandering across a 
range of laboratory contexts. Our study went still further, uniquely contrasting how cognitive and 
personality constructs are related to mind-wandering propensity in the laboratory and outside the 
lab, in daily-life settings. 
Method2 
Subjects 
Undergraduates at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, a comprehensive state 
university (and Minority Serving Institution for African American students), were invited to 
participate in an experience-sampling assessment after completing the second and third sessions 
of a laboratory study (Kane et al., 2016). Our data-collection stopping rule was to test subjects 
until at least 400 had completed three laboratory sessions and at least 200 of these had provided 
usable data for the present study. Five hundred forty-five subjects completed the first lab session, 
492 completed two sessions, and 472 completed three; 276 subjects enrolled in the ESM study 
reported here. Our target sample size of 200 was based on Monte Carlo simulations (Muthén & 
Muthén, 2002) that estimated power to detect significant Level 1 and Level 2 main effects and 
cross-level interactions (with five latent-variable predictors at Level 2). We simulated power for 
several sample sizes (100, 200, and 300) and for small, medium, and large effects. Our proposed 
sample size, which we exceeded by 37%, was sufficiently powered (> .85) to detect medium 
effects. 
We collected usable experience-sampling data from 274 subjects (188 female, 81 male, 5 with 
unreported gender), ages 18 to 35 years (M = 18.74, SD = 1.79; n = 273) after dropping 2 
subjects’ data (see Experience-Sampling Data Analyses and Screening). The self-reported racial 
distribution of the sample (n = 271) was 44% African American, 42% White, 3% Asian, 0% 
Native American or Alaskan Native, 0% Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, 6% multiracial, 
and 6% other; in response to a separate question, 8% of the sample (n = 272) reported being 
Latino or Hispanic. 
Laboratory cognitive measures 
In this section, we briefly describe the laboratory tasks and their scoring. More extended 
descriptions are provided in Kane et al. (2016). 
WMC 
In six tasks, subjects briefly maintained items in memory while engaging in additional mental 
processes. Four complex span tasks presented short sequences of items for immediate serial 
recall; each memory item was preceded by an unrelated processing task requiring a “yes” or ”no” 
response. Operation Span required subjects to recall series of three to seven letters interleaved 
with compound equations to be verified as correct or incorrect; Reading Span required subjects 
to recall series of two to six words interleaved with sentences to be verified as meaningful or 
nonsensical; Symmetry Span required subjects to recall two to five red cells presented within 4 × 
4 matrices interleaved with black-and-white grid patterns to be verified as vertically symmetrical 
or asymmetrical; Rotation Span required subjects to recall the orientations of a series of two to 
five large and small arrows (radiating from fixation) interleaved with rotated letters to be verified 
as normal or mirror-reversed. The other two WMC tasks were Running Span and Updating 
Counters. Running Span required subjects to recall the last three to seven letters from a 
sequence. The number of letters to be recalled was cued on each trial, and the total length of each 
sequence was unpredictably the same as the number of letters to be recalled or one or two letters 
longer. Updating Counters required subjects to encode the digit presented in each of three to five 
horizontally arranged boxes on each trial. After an updating phase in which two to six digit 
values could be unpredictably updated with values from −7 to +7, subjects recalled the final 
value for each box as it was cued in random order. For all six tasks, higher scores indicated 
correct recall of more items. 
Attention restraint 
In five restraint tasks, subjects needed to override a dominant response in favor of a novel one. 
Two of these tasks were antisaccade tasks, in which a cue flashed on the left or right, and 
subjects had to orient their attention to the opposite side to identify a brief, masked target 
presented there; the targets in the Antisaccade Letters task were the letters “B,” “P,” and “R,” 
and the targets in the Antisaccade Arrows task were arrows that pointed up, down, left, or right. 
The dependent measure for both antisaccade tasks was error rate. The Sustained Attention to 
Response Task (SART) was a go/no-go task requiring subjects to press a key when animal 
names were presented (89% of 675 trials) and to withhold response when vegetable names were 
presented (11% of trials); the dependent measures for the SART were d′ and intraindividual 
standard deviation of response time (RT). In the Number Stroop task, a row of two to four digits 
was presented on each trial, and subjects reported via key press the number of digits while 
ignoring their identity; incongruent arrays (e.g., “44,” “3333”) were presented on 20% of the 
trials. The dependent measure was RT for incongruent trials. The Spatial Stroop task required 
subjects to report via key press the position of a direction word (“UP,” “DOWN,” “RIGHT,” or 
“LEFT”) relative to an asterisk; the word and the asterisk were presented together, to the left or 
right of fixation or above or below fixation. On incongruent trials (33% of the trials), both the 
absolute and the relative locations of the word were incongruent with the word’s meaning (e.g., 
“DOWN” presented above the asterisk and both presented above fixation), and on congruent 
trials (33% of the trials), both the absolute and the relative locations of the word were congruent 
with the word’s meaning (e.g., “DOWN” presented below the asterisk and both presented below 
fixation). The dependent measure was the residual of incongruent-trial accuracy regressed on 
congruent-trial accuracy. 
Attention constraint 
In five flanker tasks, a target for identification was presented amid visual distractors that were 
target compatible, target incompatible, or neutral. In the Arrow Flanker task, the targets were 
right- or left-pointing arrows that were flanked horizontally by four right-pointing, left-pointing, 
or upward-pointing (neutral) arrows, and in the Letter Flanker task, the targets were normal- or 
backward-facing Fs horizontally flanked by six normal- or backward-facing Fs, on compatible 
and incompatible trials, or by six normal- or backward-facing Es and tilted Ts (90° and 270° tilt), 
on neutral trials. For both of these tasks, the dependent variables were the residual of RT on 
incompatible trials regressed on RT on neutral trials and on compatible trials (see Kane et al., 
2016, for more details on the various residual scores for the flanker tasks). In the Conditional 
Accuracy Flanker task, a target H or S was flanked horizontally by four Hs or Ss or, on neutral 
trials, by Bs; the first trial block imposed a 600-ms response deadline for each trial, and the 
second imposed a 500-ms deadline (deadline feedback was provided in both blocks). The 
dependent measures were the residual of accuracy on incompatible trials regressed on accuracy 
on neutral trials and on compatible trials. In the Masked Flanker task, a target letter was flanked 
above, below, to the left, and to the right by other letters or by colons (neutral) and the entire 
display was masked after 50 or 70 ms; the dependent variables were the residual of accuracy on 
incompatible trials regressed on accuracy on neutral trials and on compatible trials. In the Circle 
Flanker task, a target X or N was flanked by two matching letters (H, K, M, V, Y, or Z) or colons 
(neutral), along the circumference of an imaginary circle made up by eight possible target 
locations; the dependent measure was the residual of incompatible-trial RT regressed on neutral-
trial RT. 
TUTs 
Thought probes appeared unpredictably during five tasks (45 probes in the SART, 20 in the 
Number Stroop task, 20 in the Arrow Flanker task, 12 in the Letter Flanker task, and 15 in an 
otherwise-unanalyzed 2-back task). At each probe, subjects indicated which of the eight 
presented options most closely matched the content of their immediately preceding thoughts. 
Choices 3 through 8 reflected TUTs (“everyday things,” “current state of being,” “personal 
worries,” “daydreams,” “external environment,” “other”), and the mind-wandering dependent 
measure for each task was the proportion of probes in response to which subjects chose one of 
these options. 
Nonanalyzed measures 
As part of the larger project, laboratory subjects also completed schizotypy questionnaires and 
divergent-thinking tasks (see Kane et al., 2016). Associations between these measures and daily-
life experiences will be reported elsewhere. 
Scores for cognitive constructs 
We derived individual subjects’ scores for WMC, attention restraint, attention constraint, and 
TUT rate by saving factor scores from a confirmatory factor analysis on all laboratory measures 
(including the schizotypy questionnaires) using the complete laboratory subject sample 
(see Kane et al., 2016). As reported in Kane et al., all indicators loaded significantly onto their 
respective factors, and TUT rate showed good internal reliability within tasks (αs = .78–.93) and 
also demonstrated reliability by correlating across tasks (rs = .32–.68). In all subsequent analyses 
reported here, we used the four cognitive factor scores of the subjects who completed the ESM 
component of the study. Higher WMC scores reflected better performance, whereas higher 
restraint and constraint scores reflected more performance failures, and higher TUT-rate scores 
reflected more off-task thought. 
Personality measures 
During the initial information session for the ESM component of the study, subjects completed a 
computerized version of the NEO Five-Factor Inventory-3 (McCrae & Costa, 2010), a 60-item 
inventory for assessing the personality traits of openness to experience, conscientiousness, 
extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism (12 items per factor). Each item (e.g., “I often feel 
tense and jittery,” “I think it’s interesting to learn and develop new hobbies”) used a 5-point 
Likert scale, labeled strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, and strongly agree. (Subjects 
then completed two additional self-report scales that are not analyzed here.) Personality data 
were missing for 3 subjects, so the final sample size for all personality-related analyses was 271. 
ESM component 
Palm personal digital assistants (Palm Zire; Palm, Sunnyvale, CA) running ESP software (Barrett 
& Barrett, n.d.) presented all questionnaires for the ESM component of the study and collected 
responses via a stylus interface. Each questionnaire was cued by a beep. For 7 days (plus part of 
the day that included the training session), subjects were randomly signaled during each of eight 
90-min blocks from noon to midnight. After the beep, subjects had up to 5 min to begin 
responding and up to 5 min to complete the questionnaire. 
Each questionnaire (see Table 1 for items) first asked subjects whether they were mind 
wandering at the time of the beep (“yes” = 1; “no” = 2); if they had been mind wandering, 
subjects then rated the qualities of their off-task thoughts along five dimensions. These questions 
were asked first because they addressed potentially fleeting conscious states. Regardless of 
subjects’ mind-wandering status, the questionnaire then asked several questions about their 
efforts to concentrate and the subjective qualities of their thoughts (again, these questions were 
asked before other context questions to minimize forgetting). Finally, subjects answered nearly 
20 questions about their current activity and emotional context. Most items on the questionnaire 
were rated on a 7-point Likert scale (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Items on the Experience-Sampling Questionnaire 
 
Note: Items 1 and 28 required a “yes” (coded as 1) or “no” (coded as 2) response; for Item 2, 
subjects selected either “tuning out,” scored as 1, or “zoning out,” scored as 2. All other items 
were answered on a scale from 1 to 7 (1 = not at all, 4 = moderately, 7 = very much). As 
indicated in the table, Items 2 through 6 were skipped if the response to Item 1 was “no,” and 
which of Items 29 through 33 were presented depended on the response to Item 28. Each item is 
followed, in brackets, by the label used to refer to it in the subsequent tables. Responses to Items 
29 through 33 were not analyzed for the current study. 
At the ESM information session, subjects provided informed consent, and the experimenter 
explained the ESM questionnaire (including what we meant by mind wandering, with examples; 
the full instruction script is available at https://osf.io/gdyu4/), instructed subjects on how to use 
the personal digital assistants, and described the study requirements (including three brief lab 
visits to download data and report technical problems). We took pains to instruct subjects to use 
each beep as a cue to take immediate stock of their thoughts so that they could accurately answer 
the questions. For example, early in the instruction script, we said: “As you know, your thoughts 
can drift and change very quickly, so it’s very important that when you hear the beep, you 
immediately take stock of what you were actually thinking about.” Later in the script, we said, 
So, just to review, we’ll be asking you throughout the week to respond, at the beep, to questions 
about what you were thinking and doing just before the beep interrupted you [emphasis in the 
original]. Because your thoughts can change quickly, please use the beep as a signal to pay 
attention to, and remember, what exactly you were thinking about just before the PalmPilot 
beeped. 
Subjects then completed the NEO Five Factor Inventory-3. We gave them written instructions 
and laboratory contact information to take with them, and experience-sampling blocks began 
immediately following the information session. Subjects earned $50 for completing the study 
and were entered into a gift-card lottery if they attended all download appointments and 
completed at least 70% of the experience-sampling questionnaires. 
Experience-sampling data analyses and screening 
Experience-sampling data have a hierarchical structure, with questionnaire responses (Level 1) 
nested within subjects (Level 2). Therefore, our primary analyses, conducted with Mplus 7.0 
(Muthén & Muthén, 2012), used multilevel modeling with robust standard errors (MLR 
estimator). Level 1 predictors (e.g., concentration ratings at the beeps) were group-mean 
centered. Level 2 predictors (e.g., WMC factor score) were grand-mean centered for cognitive 
constructs and standardized for personality factors. Cross-level interactions tested whether 
within-person associations between Level 1 variables (e.g., the relation between concentrating 
and mind wandering) were moderated by between-person, Level 2 variables (e.g., WMC). We 
analyzed mind wandering as a categorical outcome, coded as 1 (mind wandering) or 2 (on task). 
All reported coefficients from the multilevel analyses are unstandardized, and thus their 
magnitudes are not comparable. 
Survey researchers acknowledge that subjects sometimes respond carelessly or randomly, and so 
a common strategy is to embed catch items into self-report questionnaires to identify problematic 
data and subjects (e.g., Maniaci & Rogge, 2014). In daily-life ESM studies, however, researchers 
seek to minimize the burden on subjects and rarely include noncritical items in their 
questionnaires. To screen our data for potentially problematic responding (see Sperry & Kwapil, 
in press), we calculated the variance for Items 7 through 27 in every completed survey; all of 
these items were presented as a Likert scale from 1 to 7, and they appeared on every 
questionnaire. Low variance across these items likely reflected carelessly or inattentively 
selecting (nearly) the same numerical response for each item, particularly because several items 
implied opposite responses and so should have produced divergent ratings (e.g., having pleasant 
vs. suspicious thoughts; feeling sad vs. happy; feeling safe vs. anxious; liking one’s activity vs. 
finding it boring). We then dropped all individual questionnaires with variance scores more than 
1.96 SD below the mean, thereby treating 223 completed questionnaires (2.1%) as missing data. 
Furthermore, all data from 2 subjects were removed because 56% and 39% of their 
questionnaires, respectively, were dropped for low variance. This left us with 274 subjects in the 
data set. (We decided to conduct these questionnaire-variance analyses after observing our raw 
Level 1 data; however, this decision preceded our conducting the Level 1 and Level 2 analyses.) 
Results 
For our primary analyses that were constrained by prior published findings, we set a 
conventional .05 alpha level: These replication analyses assessed (a) WMC as a cross-level 
moderator of the effect of concentration on daily-life mind wandering (Kane et al., 2007), (b) 
WMC as a cross-level moderator of the effect of effort demands on daily-life mind wandering 
(Kane et al., 2007), and (c) laboratory TUT rate as a predictor of overall mind-wandering rate 
during the week in daily life (McVay, Kane, & Kwapil, 2009). Our a priori analyses involving 
personality assessed (a) conscientiousness as a negative predictor of overall mind-wandering rate 
in daily life and neuroticism and openness as positive predictors of overall mind-wandering rate 
in daily life and (b) openness as a positive predictor of fantasy and daydreaming content of daily-
life mind wandering, neuroticism as a positive predictor of worry content, and conscientiousness 
as a positive predictor of goal-related content. Because we report many analyses in addition to 
these, we adopted an alpha of .005 for those additional analyses. 
On average, subjects completed 38.4 (SD = 11.6, range = 12–71) usable experience-sampling 
questionnaires. Completion rate did not correlate with the cognitive measures of WMC, r(272) = 
.06, p > .250; attention restraint, r(272) = −.09, p = .140; or attention constraint, r(272) = 
−.07, p > .250, but it did correlate with laboratory TUT rate, r(272) = −.20, p = .001: Subjects 
with higher lab TUT rates completed fewer questionnaires. Completion rate did not correlate (by 
our conservative .005 alpha level) with personality factors—openness: r(269) = −.08, p = .196; 
conscientiousness: r(269) = .16, p = .008; extraversion: r(269) = −.13, p = .029; 
agreeableness: r(269) = .02, p > .250; neuroticism: r(269) = −.03, p > .250 (although effect sizes 
for conscientiousness and extraversion were arguably as expected). 
Associations among the cognitive and personality predictor variables 
Table 2 presents the correlations among our predictor variables. The results were consistent with 
the latent-variable findings from the full laboratory sample (Kane et al., 2016) and with findings 
of prior studies (McVay & Kane, 2012b; Unsworth & McMillan, 2014) in that laboratory TUT 
rate was modestly negatively correlated with WMC and more strongly positively correlated with 
failures of attention restraint and constraint. TUT rate was also positively correlated with 
neuroticism, as found previously by Robison et al. (2017) but uncorrelated with openness, as 
found previously by Smeekens and Kane (2016). No other personality factors significantly 
predicted lab TUT rate. Note that the inconsistently demonstrated correlation between 
conscientiousness and TUT rate (Jackson & Balota, 2012, vs. Jackson et al., 2013) was not 
significant by our conservative threshold, but would have been by a more liberal and typical 
one, r(269) = −.13, p = .040. 
 
Table 2. Correlations Among the Cognitive and Personality Predictor Variables From the 
Laboratory 
 
Note: N = 274 for correlations involving only cognitive variables and 271 for correlations 
involving a personality variable. TUT = task-unrelated thought. **p < .005. 
Overall rate and content of daily-life mind wandering 
The overall rate of mind wandering reported on the experience-sampling questionnaires over the 
course of the week was, on average, 32% (SD = 17%, range = 2–97%), matching our prior 
findings that undergraduates’ thoughts are off task 30% of the time (Kane et al., 2007; McVay et 
al., 2009; see also Franklin et al., 2013; Marcusson-Clavertz et al., 2016; Song & Wang, 2012). 
These results reinforce the idea that mind wandering is generally a common occurrence that 
nonetheless varies greatly in frequency among young adults, perhaps because of cognitive and 
personality differences. When subjects reported mind-wandering episodes, they indicated they 
were “tuned out” (i.e., mind wandering with some awareness) 60.4% of the time and “zoned out” 
(i.e., mind wandering without awareness) 39.6% of the time. Their mean ratings for mind-
wandering content (on a scale from 1 to 7) were 3.79 (SE = 0.08) for daydreams and fantasy, 
3.20 (SE = 0.07) for worries and problems, 4.39 (SE = 0.07) for things they needed to do, and 
3.63 (SE = 0.07) for visual and auditory surroundings. Off-task thoughts thus tended to happen 
with awareness and, with respect to content, to focus on everyday plans and goals. 
Contextual predictors of daily-life mind wandering in the moment 
When tested individually, many of the contextual variables significantly predicted mind 
wandering in the moment (see Table 3): Subjects tended to be more mentally on task when they 
tried harder to concentrate, when they engaged in preferred activities that they were performing 
well, and when they were happier and their situations were generally more positive. Subjects 
tended to mind wander more when they were experiencing more negative affect (feeling anxious, 
sad, irritable, and confused), when they felt more tired, and when their activities were more 
boring. The probability of mind wandering was statistically unaffected by whether subjects were 
alone or with other people, by how safe they felt in their context, or by how effortful their current 
activity was or how stressful their current situation was. When all of the contextual variables 
were entered into a single model, however, only three met our conservative significance criterion 
for predicting unique variance in mind wandering: Subjects were more on task when they tried 
harder to concentrate, and they were more off task when they felt more anxious and when their 
activity was more boring. 
Table 3. Modeling Results for Contextual Predictors of On-Task Thought (Versus Mind 
Wandering), With Each Predictor Tested Individually and All Predictors Modeled Together 
 
Note: For the outcome variable, a higher score indicated more on-task thought and a lower score 
indicated more mind wandering. Values inside brackets are 95% confidence intervals. 
Significant effects (p < .005) are highlighted in boldface. 
Executive-control ability, daily-life mind-wandering rate, and context 
Before exploring individual differences in daily-life mind wandering, we considered the 
reliability of our assessment, particularly because whether thinking was on or off task was 
substantially influenced by the prevailing context. In fact, mind-wandering rates were 
statistically reliable. We estimated reliability for the first, mind-wandering, experience-sampling 
questionnaire item in a many-facet Rasch model framework (Eckes, 2011) using FACETS 3.71.4 
(Linacre, 2014). This class of mixed Rasch models can estimate reliability for a single item 
assessed repeatedly, even when the item is categorical and subjects differ in number of 
responses. Rasch reliability—the true lower bound of reliability (Linacre, 1997)—for this mind-
wandering item was .77, which indicated that it had a good ability to discriminate among 
people’s propensities to mind wander in daily life. 
McVay et al. (2009) found that laboratory TUT rate predicted the rate of daily-life mind 
wandering overall, whereas Kane et al. (2007) found that WMC predicted the rate of daily-life 
mind wandering only as a function of the cognitive demands of the context (i.e., lower-WMC 
subjects mind-wandered more than higher-WMC subjects when they tried harder to concentrate 
and their activities were more challenging or effortful than usual). In the current study, 
laboratory TUT rate did not significantly (α = .05) predict mind-wandering rate in daily life, b = 
−0.18, 95% confidence interval (CI) = [−0.37, −0.02], z = −1.81, p = .070, although this nearly 
significant effect was in the same direction as in McVay et al. (2009); more TUTs in the lab 
predicted more mind wandering (less on-task thinking) in daily life. Given that our sample was 
larger (N = 274 vs. 72) and we observed only a marginal effect, we must conclude that any 
relation between laboratory and overall daily-life mind-wandering propensities is not robust. 
None of the other cognitive constructs predicted overall mind-wandering rate in daily life, even 
though they significantly predicted TUT rate in the lab (WMC: b = .01, 95% CI = [−0.17, 
0.19], z = 0.14, p > .250; attention restraint: b = −0.07, 95% CI = [−0.21, 0.08], z = −0.87, p > 
.250; attention constraint: b = −0.27, 95% CI = [−0.60, 0.06], z = −1.62, p = .106). 
We did find, however, that WMC significantly moderated the association between self-reported 
concentration efforts and mind wandering (see Table 4, which reports cross-level interactions for 
each of the cognitive-ability factors with each of the experience-sampling contextual variables). 
This result contrasts with the laboratory findings from Smeekens and Kane (2016), but, as Figure 
1 illustrates, the cross-level interaction reported by Kane et al. (2007) in their daily-life study 
was replicated. As subjects reported trying harder than usual to concentrate, those with higher 
WMC were more mentally on task than were those with lower WMC; moreover, as subjects 
reported trying less than usual to concentrate, those with higher WMC mind-wandered more than 
did those with lower WMC. Viewed another way, the steeper slope for higher-WMC subjects 
suggests that their conscious experiences were more responsive to their concentration efforts 
than were those of lower-WMC subjects; in other words, higher-WMC subjects exerted better 
control over their thoughts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Modeling Results for Cross-Level Interactions of Level 1 Cognitive Predictors of On-
Task Thought (Versus Mind Wandering) With Level 2 Cognitive Constructs From the 
Laboratory (Each Tested Individually) 
 
Note: For the outcome variable, a higher score indicated more on-task thought and a lower score 
indicated more mind wandering. Values inside brackets are 95% confidence intervals. 
Significant effects (p < .05 for the analyses listed in the first paragraph of the Results section, p < 
.005 for all other analyses) are highlighted in boldface. TUT = task-unrelated thought. 
 
Fig. 1. The relation between daily-life mind wandering and self-reported concentration among 
subjects with higher versus lower working memory capacity (WMC; top row), attention-restraint 
failure rates (middle row), and laboratory rates of task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs; bottom row). 
In the left column, the graphed lines depict the means of the within-person slopes for subjects in 
the top and bottom quartiles of these three executive-control abilities, and the values on the x-
axis represent the group-centered ratings for daily-life concentration; the mind-wandering 
dependent variable was scored as either 1 (for off-task thoughts) or 2 (for on-task thoughts). In 
the graphs in the right column, each dot represents the results for an individual subject; values on 
the x-axis represent grand-mean-centered scores for WMC, rate of attention restraint failure, and 
laboratory TUT rate, and values on the y-axis represent the slope of the effect of concentration 
rating on the probability of on-task thought (vs. mind wandering) in daily life (steeper positive 
slopes indicate stronger positive associations between momentary concentration and on-task 
thinking). 
Table 4 also indicates that WMC did not moderate the association between the subjective effort 
required by students’ activities and their mind wandering; thus, our study did not replicate the 
finding (from Kane et al., 2007) that lower-WMC subjects mind-wandered more than did higher-
WMC subjects as their activities became more effortful. Note also that this lack of an association 
between WMC and mind wandering under conditions of high effort (see also Marcusson-
Clavertz et al., 2016) seems to conflict with lab findings that WMC predicts TUTs only during 
relatively demanding tasks (e.g., Levinson et al., 2012; McVay & Kane, 2012a). 
Although the cross-level interaction involving effort was not replicated, the cross-level 
interaction involving concentration was significant not only for WMC, but also for attention-
restraint and laboratory TUT rates (α = .005). Table 4 and Figure 1 indicate that subjects with 
fewer attention-restraint failures and fewer laboratory TUTs also were more effectively on task 
as they reported trying harder than usual to concentrate on their ongoing activity than were 
subjects with more attention-restraint failures and more laboratory TUTs. Similarly, the higher-
ability subjects tended to mind-wander more than the lower-ability subjects on occasions when 
they tried to concentrate less than usual. It is all the more impressive that this cross-level 
interaction pattern was replicated across our cognitive individual difference variables given that 
laboratory TUT rate correlated only modestly with WMC. These constructs were not simply 
redundant, but they should share some executive-control-related variance. 
Indeed, we tested the hypothesis that general executive-control processes drove the associations 
between cognitive abilities and the self-regulation of daily-life mind wandering, in two ways. 
The first was analogous to simultaneous multiple regression, which assesses whether predictors 
account for variance in an outcome above and beyond the variance accounted for by the other 
predictors in the model. Specifically, we entered all three significant cognitive predictors into the 
model for the cross-level interaction between concentration and mind wandering, to see whether 
any executive-control construct moderated the interaction independently of the others. They did 
not (WMC: b = 0.12, 95% CI = [−0.04, 0.28], z = 1.50, p = .133; attention restraint: b = −0.03, 
95% CI = [−0.15, 0.10], z = −0.46, p > .250; laboratory TUT rate: b = −0.10, 95% CI = [−0.21, 
0.01], z = −1.77, p = .077); these conclusions also held when the constraint factor was added to 
the model. 
Second, we used structural equation modeling to model the predictor variables as reflecting both 
general (shared) executive-control variance and domain-specific variance. Specifically, we saved 
factor scores from a bifactor structural model from Kane et al. (2016), which represented the 
variance shared by all WMC, restraint, constraint, and TUT measures as a general executive-
control factor. It also modeled the variance common to the WMC tasks but not shared with the 
other tasks as a WMC-residual (specific) factor, and the variance common to the TUT measures 
but not shared with the other tasks as a TUT-residual (specific) factor. In this analysis, the 
general executive-control factor moderated the effect of concentration on daily-life mind 
wandering, b = −0.14, 95% CI = [−0.22, −0.07], z = −3.82, p < .001, whereas the WMC-residual 
factor and the TUT-residual factor did not, b = 0.05, 95% CI = [−0.05, 0.14], z = 0.98, p > .250, 
and b = −0.10, 95% CI = [−0.21, 0.01], z = −1.83, p = .068, respectively. Both analyses reinforce 
the conclusion that the executive-control variance shared among WMC, attention restraint, and 
laboratory TUT propensity drove their interactions with concentration efforts in predicting daily-
life mind wandering. 
As in Kane et al. (2007), the cognitive-ability constructs did not moderate the influences of other 
contextual predictors of mind wandering, such as how boring subjects’ activities were and how 
anxious subjects felt (see Table 4). That is, lower-WMC subjects did not simply report more 
mind wandering than higher-WMC subjects when they were relatively bored, or relatively 
anxious, or doing relatively undesirable activities. These findings indicate, again, that the effects 
of cognitive ability on mind wandering are limited to contexts in which subjects attempt to bring 
their executive-control abilities to bear on regulating thought via concentration, and are not 
merely the result of common folk theories about when people should or should not experience 
mind wandering in everyday life. Moreover, WMC does not moderate the association between 
concentration and mind wandering in the laboratory (Smeekens & Kane, 2016), as it did in the 
present study and in Kane et al. (2007), and so WMC’s moderation of the relation between 
concentration and daily-life mind wandering does not appear to reflect a WMC-related bias or 
belief about TUTs and concentration. 
Executive-control ability and qualities of daily-life thought 
Whether or not subjects were currently mind wandering, they always answered eight questions 
about the subjective controllability and content of their thoughts. Table 5 indicates that, overall, 
on-task thoughts were significantly more pleasant and clear than off-task thoughts, and 
significantly less strange, suspicious, racing, and uncontrollable. Mind-wandering experiences, 
then, were relatively negative in our sample, which is consistent with findings reported 
by Killingsworth and Gilbert (2010; see also Kane et al., 2007; McVay et al., 2009). 
Table 5. Modeling Results for On-Task Thought (Versus Mind Wandering) in the Moment as a 
Predictor of Thought Qualities 
 
Note: Positive coefficients indicate experiences that were more likely when subjects were on 
task, and negative coefficients indicate experiences that were more likely when subjects were 
mind wandering. Values inside brackets are 95% confidence intervals. Significant effects (p < 
.005) are highlighted in boldface. 
On those occasions when subjects reported mind wandering, the content of their off-task thought 
was not generally associated with the executive-attention constructs we measured (see Table 6). 
Thus, subjects of higher cognitive ability were no more or less likely to zone out without 
awareness, to daydream, to worry, to think about their unfulfilled goals and plans, or to be 
distracted by their immediate environment than were subjects of lower ability. (We thus failed to 
replicate an exploratory finding, from McVay et al., 2009, that subjects with higher lab TUT 
rates reported more worrying in their daily-life mind wandering than did those with lower lab 
TUT rates.) 
Table 6. Modeling Results for Cognitive Constructs From the Laboratory (Each Tested 
Individually) as Predictors of Daily-Life Thought Qualities 
 
Note: Values inside brackets are 95% confidence intervals. Significant effects (p < .005) are 
highlighted in boldface. TUT = task-unrelated thoughts. 
In contrast, several cognitive constructs predicted other subjective qualities of thought—most 
notably the perceived self-regulation of thought—regardless of whether subjects were on or off 
task in the moment (see Table 6). Attention-restraint failure and lab TUT rate significantly 
predicted subjective ratings of the controllability of thoughts in the moment; these effects were 
nearly significant also for WMC and attention-constraint failures (ps = .007 and .008, 
respectively), and are consistent with the steeper slopes between concentration attempts and 
mind wandering (on- vs. off-task thinking) for higher-ability subjects than for lower-ability 
subjects (depicted in Fig. 1). Subjects with higher laboratory TUT rates also endorsed more 
strongly the statement that their current thoughts were racing, and subjects with more attention-
restraint failures were more likely to report that their thoughts felt controlled by someone or 
something else. Regarding qualities of thought content, subjects with more restraint failures in 
the lab reported stranger thoughts in everyday life. 
Personality traits, mind-wandering rate, and mind-wandering content 
As a preliminary validity check for our personality questionnaire measures, we assessed whether 
they correlated with the experience-sampling daily-life indicators that one would theoretically 
expect them to (see Table S1 in the Supplemental Material). Indeed, subjects higher in openness 
to experience reported engaging in less boring activities in the moment. Subjects higher in 
neuroticism reported feeling less happy and feeling more confused, irritable, anxious, tired, and 
sad, and they described their activities and contexts as more boring, more stressful, less liked, 
and less positive. Subjects higher in conscientiousness reported being more successful in their 
current activity, subjects higher in agreeableness reported feeling more happy and described their 
situation as more positive, and subjects higher in extraversion felt more happy (but also more 
confused) in the moment. 
Returning to our primary questions, when we tested the personality factors simultaneously, we 
found that only openness to experience significantly (α = .05) predicted overall daily-life mind-
wandering rate (Table 7); higher openness was associated with more mind wandering. Recall that 
openness was unassociated with laboratory TUT rate, both in the present study and in Smeekens 
and Kane (2016). Moreover, although neuroticism correlated positively with lab TUT rate (see 
also Jackson et al., 2013; Robison et al., 2017), neither neuroticism nor conscientiousness 
(see Jackson & Balota, 2012) predicted everyday mind wandering, even in analyses in which 
each of these personality constructs was the only predictor in the model (neuroticism: z < 1, p > 
.250; conscientiousness: z = 1.36, p = .175). 
Table 7. Modeling Results for the Five-Factor Personality Traits as Predictors of On-Task 
Thought (Versus Mind Wandering) and of Mind-Wandering Content 
 
Note: For this analysis, all predictors were standardized and modeled simultaneously. A higher 
score for mind wandering indicated more on-task thought, and a lower score indicated more 
mind wandering. Values inside brackets are 95% confidence intervals. Significant effects (p < 
.05 for the analyses listed in the first paragraph of the Results section, p < .005 for all other 
analyses) are highlighted in boldface. 
As predicted (see Table 7), on occasions when subjects reported mind wandering, those who 
were higher in openness endorsed more fantastical-day-dream content than did those lower in 
openness, whereas those higher in neuroticism endorsed more worry-based content than did 
those lower in neuroticism. (Our expectation that high conscientiousness would predict more 
thinking about unfulfilled tasks and goals during mind wandering was not confirmed, even when 
conscientiousness was the only predictor modeled, z = 1.21, p = .226.) Personality did not 
otherwise predict the content of subjects’ mind wandering (Table 7). In addition, the fact that 
off-task thoughts were generally reported as less pleasant and clear, and more out of control, 
strange, racing, and suspicious, than on-task thoughts (see prior discussion of Table 5) did not 
change significantly with personality (see Table S2 in the Supplemental Material). So, for 
example, subjects high in openness did not differentially experience mind wandering as 
especially more pleasant than on-task thought, despite their more frequently engaging in fantasy; 
nor did subjects high in neuroticism experience mind wandering as especially less pleasant than 
on-task thought, despite their more frequently engaging in worry. 
Personality and contextual predictors of mind wandering and subjective qualities of thought 
In contrast to the executive-ability constructs, none of the personality factors moderated the 
influence of in-the-moment concentration on mind wandering; they also did not moderate any 
other theoretically coherent contextual influence (e.g., momentary happiness, irritability, anxiety, 
sadness, activity effort, and stress) on mind wandering (see Table S3 in the Supplemental 
Material). So, for example, openness predicted daily-life mind wandering regardless of how 
relaxed (i.e., nonanxious) subjects felt at the time. Similarly, neuroticism failed to predict mind 
wandering regardless of how irritable or anxious subjects felt. Conscientiousness did not predict 
mind wandering even when people reported engaging in effortful activities. 
Our final analyses tested for influences of personality on other subjective qualities of thought in 
the moment (collapsed across occasions of on-task and off-task thinking, as in the parallel 
analyses involving cognitive predictors). All of the significant effects (α = .005) were driven by 
neuroticism, agreeableness, and extraversion (Table 8). Subjects who were higher in neuroticism 
reported less pleasant and clear thoughts, and more racing thoughts, than did those lower in 
neuroticism. More highly agreeable subjects reported more pleasant thoughts and less strange, 
suspicious, and externally controlled thoughts than did less agreeable subjects. Subjects who 
were higher in extraversion reported more racing, strange, and suspicious thoughts than did those 
lower in extraversion. 
 
Table 8. Modeling Results for the Five-Factor Personality Traits as Predictors of Daily-Life 
Thought Qualities 
 
Note: For this analysis, all predictors were standardized and modeled simultaneously. Values 
inside brackets are 95% confidence intervals. Significant effects (p < .005) are highlighted in 
boldface. 
Discussion 
We found not only robust individual differences in how daily-life mind wandering (Kane et al., 
2007) is related to cognitive abilities and personality factors, but also suggestive discrepancies 
between laboratory and daily-life results. Effects that were modest but replicated prior results in 
one domain were not observed in the other. To understand individual differences in mind 
wandering, then, context matters (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). 
Individual differences in executive control in the lab versus life 
Whereas prototypical executive-control constructs—WMC, attention restraint, and attention 
constraint—correlated with mind wandering in the lab, they did not correlate with daily-life mind 
wandering; indeed, even laboratory TUT rate did not significantly predict daily-life mind 
wandering (the effect was only marginally significant, though in the expected direction). 
Executive abilities, instead, predicted mind wandering only as a function of subjects’ 
concentration attempts, a pattern replicating and extending the findings of Kane et al. (2007): 
When subjects tried harder to concentrate, those with better executive abilities mind-wandered 
less than those with worse abilities; when not trying to concentrate, subjects with better 
executive abilities mind-wandered more than those with worse abilities. Such contingencies on 
concentration were not observed in three laboratory experiments examining WMC’s association 
with mind wandering (Smeekens & Kane, 2016). Moreover, prior laboratory findings that WMC 
negatively predicted mind wandering in challenging but not easy tasks (e.g., McVay & Kane, 
2012a; Rummel & Boywitt, 2014) was absent in our analyses of daily-life mind wandering: 
Subjective effort demanded by activities did not moderate the associations between executive 
control and mind wandering. This finding contradicts results reported by Kane et al. (2007) but 
replicates those reported by Marcusson-Clavertz et al. (2016). 
Thus, executive abilities that substantially influence laboratory mind wandering play more 
circumscribed roles in everyday life, and the variables that affect the association between 
executive control and mind wandering in the lab may not be the variables that affect the 
association between executive control and mind wandering in daily life. In the lab, task difficulty 
drives executive contributions to reducing TUTs. In everyday life, executive processes serve 
people’s attempts to concentrate on ongoing activities, regardless of (subjective) difficulty. 
The lab-life discrepancy regarding “difficulty” may reflect the fact that subjective feelings of 
effort assessed ecologically do not map directly to determinants of performance that are 
manipulated in laboratories. Perhaps experiments effect subtle cognitive changes that are either 
not present or not subjectively detectable in everyday contexts, but that objectively influence 
mind wandering by selectively engaging or disengaging critical executive mechanisms 
(see McVay & Kane, 2012a). After all, many subjectively challenging tasks do not elicit WMC-
related variation in performance because they do not tap into executive processes of attention 
restraint or constraint (e.g., Kane, Poole, Tuholski, & Engle, 2006; Smeekens & Kane, 2016). 
Laboratory findings may thus indicate what is possible about the association between executive 
control and mind wandering, but their implications may be negligible for most everyday 
conscious experiences. 
Our results for the effects of concentration in daily life may not be replicated in the laboratory 
because of an inherently restricted range of activities: Compared with action video games, 
animated political discussions, or attempts to woo a crush, for example, lab tasks may not be 
engaging, important, and challenging enough to elicit maximal concentration efforts from many 
subjects. Similarly, compared with watching TV, showering, or mowing a lawn, lab tasks may 
not be effortless and routine enough to elicit minimal concentration. Re-creating the diversity of 
not just the difficulty but also the motivated engagement that is characteristic of activities of 
daily life may be unrealistic even within the most creatively designed and task-inclusive lab 
settings, especially because adults sometimes choose their daily-life contexts. 
Individual differences in personality in the lab versus life 
Similar lab-life dissociations are evident for the personality variables. As did Jackson et al. 
(2013) and Robison et al. (2017), we found that neuroticism positively predicted laboratory TUT 
rate, and as did Smeekens and Kane (2016), we found that openness did not predict laboratory 
TUT rate. In daily life, however, we found the reverse: Openness positively predicted mind-
wandering rate, but neuroticism was not a significant predictor of mind-wandering rate. Why? 
If openness reflects tendencies toward playful and creative fantasy—which would be consistent 
with the association we found between openness and daydreaming thought content—then more 
open subjects should engage in more mind wandering than less open subjects when everyday life 
provides opportunity (McMillan et al., 2013). But assuming that their penchant for daydreaming 
is not pathological, more open subjects should not have any more difficulty than less open 
subjects in focusing attention when they must, as in the lab. This idea jibes with previous reports 
that openness is correlated with retrospective-questionnaire assessments of positive-constructive 
daydreaming (e.g., “I find my daydreams are worthwhile and interesting to me,” “I imagine 
solving all my problems in my daydreams”) but not everyday distractibility (e.g., “At times it is 
hard for me to keep my mind from wandering,” “My imagination goes around and around in the 
same circle”; Zhiyan & Singer, 1996–1997). 
Why should neuroticism predict laboratory but not daily-life mind wandering? Highly neurotic 
adults may find the laboratory particularly anxiety arousing because of its novelty and its 
association with evaluation; the lab may thus elicit negative self-reflections about competence 
and ability, or threat of the experimenter’s judgment. These evaluative cues may be especially 
effective TUT triggers for subjects with relatively low emotional stability. We had expected 
neuroticism to predict daily-life mind-wandering rate, thinking that highly neurotic subjects 
might worry or ruminate excessively, even when trying to focus attention on their activities 
(Perkins, Arnone, Smallwood, & Mobbs, 2015). Our findings, however, corroborate arguments 
that what distinguishes positive and negative outcomes of repetitive thinking in anxiety and 
depression is not its quantity, but rather its affective valence, its context, and its generality (i.e., 
level of construal; Watkins, 2008), perhaps, in part, because people avoid negative or threatening 
environments in daily life. Thus, neuroticism may not so much increase propensity for mind 
wandering overall—or even in response to negative affect—but may instead increase particularly 
negative content of mind wandering when it occurs. Indeed, neuroticism specifically predicted 
worried mind wandering in daily life. 
Individual differences in subjective thought qualities in daily life 
The present study went beyond examining mind-wandering content, to also investigate thought 
qualities transcending task relatedness. Executive abilities tended to predict subjective 
controllability of thought; poorer executive-task performance was associated with less 
controllable (and, to some extent, more racing and externally controlled) thoughts. Personality 
also correlated with thought qualities in predictable ways; for example, more agreeable subjects 
reported more pleasant thoughts, and more extraverted subjects reported more racing thoughts. 
Subjects higher in neuroticism reported more racing thoughts and less clear thinking, despite not 
experiencing more mind wandering. 
Conclusion 
These cognitive and personality findings suggest that scientists interested in the causes, contents, 
and consequences of spontaneous thought might benefit from expanding their investigations 
beyond overt mind-wandering episodes to additional qualities of subjective cognitive experience. 
Moreover, researchers must remember that laboratories are not neutral environments that affect 
everyone—and everyone’s conscious experiences—equally. Although divergences between 
laboratory and daily-life predictors of mind wandering might not affect theories about the 
contributions of TUTs to performance on particular laboratory tasks (e.g., McVay & Kane, 
2009, 2012a), they suggest that general mind-wandering theories based largely or completely on 
laboratory findings do not capture all of mind wandering’s causes or correlates as it actually 
occurs in everyday experience. 
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Notes 
1.Marcusson-Clavertz et al. found that one WMC measure predicted daily-life mind wandering 
only for subjects with “guilty” daydreaming styles. WMC did not interact with cognitive demand 
(the “concentration required by activity,” p. 455) to predict mind wandering, so this study did not 
replicate the findings of Kane et al. (2007). 
2.Note that we report how we determined our sample size and all data exclusions, manipulations, 
and measures in the study (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2012). 
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